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1 Introduction 
The continuous growth of the Internet, and its 
increasingly presence as a means for Telecommunication, 
makes progressively relevant the identification of 
anomalous behaviors in network traffic. This research 
topic is becoming important also in telephone networks, 
due to the fact that the use of VoIP (Voice over IP) 
technologies is more and more widespread today. Indeed, 
beyond the remarkable advantage of lower costs and the 
access to a large number of web-based services, such as 
video communications or text-messaging chat, many IP-
based threats that plagued Internet users start to be 
directed to the VoIP services. It is really easy to foresee 
that VoIP users are already targets of attacks such as 
Telemarketer activity, Eavesdropping, Identity theft and 
Denial of Services. 
To reveal this type of attack, several intrusion detection 
systems have been developed over time, even in 
telephone context. An intrusion detection system can 
follow two different approaches: signature-based, where 
the system identifies patterns of traffic or application 
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behaviors recognized to be malicious; anomaly detection-
based, where the system gathers a “normal” baseline 
through statistical analysis and compare the activities 
within the network of application with it. For this reason, 
this second type of intrusion detection system is in 
general preferred when the working scenario is 
unsupervised, i.e. there is no a priori knowledge of the 
normal or the anomalous behavior of the traffic.  
As we can see in the following chapter, in a VoIP 
environment, or more generally in a telephone network, 
the intrusion detection techniques can exploit several 
informations to identify anomalous behaviors. For this 
reason, they can work both at a fine-grained level, 
evaluating if a given call or the behavior of a user is 
anomalous or not, both looking to the general behavior of 
the user and analyzing the statistics of its calls.  
In general, in the first case we talk of intrusion detection 
techniques
[1]
 that can be found at each level of the 
telephone network, from the backbone to the end-user 
systems, because they are able to identify anomalous 
behaviors looking to the management plane, for example 
the header of the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) 
9 
 
packets, but also to the data plane, for example the Real 
Time Protocol (RTP) packets.  
In general, in the second case we talk of unsupervised 
anomaly detection techniques
[2]
 that rely on a central 
node able to collect raw data regarding the calls of the 
phone users, to gather the description of a legitimate user 
profile, and to perform anomaly detection based on it. 
For example, it is possible to define the set of behaviors 
exhibited by the majority of the phone users as the 
legitimate profile. In this kind of intrusion detection 
systems, there are various types of data used to analyze 
the statistics of a phone call but one of the most 
immediate way to get this information is through the Call 
Detail Records (CDRs). Indeed, the CDRs are labels used 
for billing purpose and they contain general information 
for each call, such as the source and destination phone 
number and the call duration.  
This work represents mine contribution to the research in 
this field and is the result of a six-month internship at the 
Network Laboratories of NEC, Heidelberg (Germany). 
The work was performed thanks to the collaboration of 
my local supervisor, Dr. Maurizio Dusi, and my referent 
for University of Pisa, Dr. Christian Callegari. 
10 
 
In this thesis we propose a novel anomaly detection 
technique that tries to solve two of the main drawbacks 
of having a central node responsible for the anomaly 
detection stage:  
1. it does not allow to take advantage of the probes 
already distributed over the network. For scalability 
reason, telephone networks are commonly designed 
according to a hierarchical topology
[15]
, where Points 
of Presence (PoPs) are the bridge between end users 
and the overall network infrastructure, and each PoP 
is already able to collect and to process the 
information regarding the part of the network they are 
able to see.  
2. anomalies that are localized on few PoPs can pollute 
the description of the legitimate profile when 
aggregated together, thus affecting the classification 
decision of the central node. For instance, if a certain 
attitude is sparse over few PoPs, contribute to form 
the legitimate profile when data are considered as a 
whole, since the aggregation hides the sparseness of 
the activity. 
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To overcome these issues, our methodology allows 
operators to gather an unsupervised description of a 
pollution-free normal user behavior of their network and 
subsequently to perform distributed anomaly detection, 
thus taking advantage of the topology of the network 
itself. The methodology gathers the behaviors of each 
users analyzing them during a specific interval of time, 
through general statistics obtained from the CDRs of 
their calls and, in the processing stage, it combines 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a well-known 
method for network anomaly detection
[3][12][13]
, with 
Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering (AHC), a method 
used in the complex network field to identify community 
within a network
[4]
. 
In mathematical terms, through PCA it is possible to 
represent a high dimensional space, given in our case by 
different statistics describing the telephone activities of 
each user, in a new reference system. The dimensions of 
the new reference system, called typically Principal 
Components (PCs), are a linear combination of the 
original ones, and are defined in such a way that the first 
one points towards the direction that account for as much 
of the variability in the data as possible, and each 
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succeeding ones points towards the direction of the 
highest variability possible, under the constraint that it be 
orthogonal to each preceding dimension. With such a 
transformation of the original reference system, the first 
PCs obtained are able to collect most of the variance 
within the dataset and to describe the “common” 
behaviors within the network. For this reason, the first 
PCs are the descriptors of the so-called normal subspace 
and the descriptions of users well approximated by only 
means of them represent the legitimate profile. 
Conversely, descriptions of users that also need the 
remaining components, that describe the so-called 
anomalous subspace, represent rare behaviors within the 
network and they can be labeled as anomalous.  
The idea is to let each PoP perform PCA on its portion of 
users, gathers the description of the normal subspace and 
send it to a central node. The central node then applies an 
AHC algorithm to identify communities of probes with 
similar description of the normal subspace and select the 
community that contains the legitimate profile. 
Eventually each PoP exploits such profile to perform 
PCA-based anomaly detection on its own set of users. 
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To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed 
methodology, we compare it against a classical 
application of the PCA on a given dataset, i.e. a 
centralized approach where a central node performs PCA 
on the whole set of users present within the network.  
Experimental results show that our distributed technique 
has several advantages over the centralized approach. 
First, it is able to point out behaviors of users that are 
widespread within PoPs, whereas in the centralized 
approach such behaviors affect the computation of the 
normal subspace. Second, our approach leads to a profile 
which is stable over time. 
In more detail our contribution is: 
 a parallelization of the computation of PCs on a 
hierarchical topology; 
 a distributed technique for PCA-based anomaly 
detection; 
 design of an unsupervised mechanism for 
automatically gathering the profile of legitimate 
phone users; 
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 profiling of actual phone users labeled as 
anomalous. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. In 
Chapter 2 we present the possible attack that can be 
brought to a telephone network and in general how they 
can be faced exploiting the available information. In 
Chapter 3 we present a classical application of the PCA 
with an example of how the computation of the PCs can 
be parallelized, exploiting the hierarchical topology of a 
telephone network. In Chapter 4 we present our 
technique in detail, showing the exchange of messages 
needed to make it work. In Chapter 5 we present 
experimental results obtained with our technique in 
several weeks of real telephone traffic and a comparison 
with the results obtained with the centralized approach. 
In Chapter 6 we present our conclusions and a possible 
application of our technique in a network where more 
than one operator is present. 
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2 Security issues in a telephone 
network 
The typical flexibility of VoIP solutions also creates, in 
addition to obvious advantages as outlined above, serious 
security problems for communication systems that 
employ it. Since VoIP is directly connected with the data 
network, bringing an attack is much easier than it was in 
the traditional telephone network. 
Over time, the scientific community has listed several 
possible attacks towards VOIP or classical telephone 
architecture. A complete overview can be found in [5]. 
Below we provide the more important set of these 
attacks, showing which of them can be pointed out 
observing the general behavior of a user through a 
statistical approach. 
2.1 Attack classification 
The threats that may be brought towards phone 
architectures may be divided into using 5 basic groups: 
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 Eavesdropping: the attacker can monitor and 
intercept the entire signaling and/or the flow of data 
two or more phone users exchange. 
 
The attacker, however, cannot change them. In the 
PSTN, this type of attack was only possible with a tap 
in the terminal user. With VoIP, it is possible to bring 
it with success if you have easy access to the Internet 
and appropriate tools. This type of attack, as well as 
the obvious invasion of privacy, can lead to the 
interception of sensitive information, ranging from 
simple e-mail address, stolen to be used in a 
Fig. 2.1 Eavesdropping of a call 
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following attack of SPAM, to the number of credit 
card or bank account. 
 Interception and Modification Threats: in this 
case, the attacker is also able to change the signaling 
or the data flow. The attacker is able to interpose 
himself on calls routed to other telephone users (man 
in the middle attack), or modify the signaling so that 
the communication is supported with a degraded 
QoS. 
 
Fig. 2.2 Men in the Middle attack 
 Abuse of Service threats: this attack is used to 
commit fraud or to avoid paying certain telephone 
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services. Indeed, the attacker tries to steal the identity 
of someone else and let them pay the consequences of 
his behavior. The identity theft is also used by 
spammers, in order to avoid some of the prevention 
technique adopted from telephone network. 
In general this type of attack especially plagues VoIP 
users and is difficult to prevent only looking to the 
general behavior of the users. Given the type of anomaly 
detection technique we are proposing, this type of attack 
is out of the scope of this thesis. Otherwise, these threats 
are faced by the use of security software tools such as: 
 Authentication: is needed to understand who the 
sender of a specific call or packet is. Authentication 
can take place between different entities or end-to-
end. 
 Encryption: is needed to protect the content of 
packets from being read by other parties than the ones 
which are supposed to be their receiver. Encryption 
follows the same paradigm as authentication, and can 
be done between two gateways in a tunneling mode, 
or directly on an end-to-end basis. 
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The remaining groups of attacks are: 
 Interruption of Service: this type of attacks tries to 
compromise the availability of a given service, and it 
can be brought in several ways: sending invalid 
request so complex which may have the effect of a 
sharp slowdown or even a crash by a Proxy Server; 
sending a huge number of requests from a single 
entity of the telephone network (Denial of Service 
attack) or from more points at the same time 
(Distributed Denial of Service), saturating the 
resources available at a Proxy Server or an endpoint; 
trying to redirect a call that already exists towards a 
different endpoint or Proxy Server or to tear it down, 
sending a BYE or CANCEL request. 
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Fig. 2.3 DoS attack 
 Social Threats: among other type of attacks, there 
belongs the activity of telemarketers, where malicious 
user tries to deliver unsolicited, lawful or unlawful 
content regarding product or services. This type of 
SPAM is already present in the traditional PSTN 
network, but can be potentially more dangerous in 
VoIP architecture. Indeed, a telemarketer as to face 
considerably reduced cost in order to make such calls, 
both in the method by which these calls are placed (a 
simple software), both in the material costs of the 
calls themselves (they can exploit flat rates). 
A statistical approach, like the one we are proposing in 
this work, is able to face this last categories of attack 
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thanks to the fact that the activities of such malicious 
users is significantly different from the common behavior 
of a normal user. For example, analyzing the incoming 
and outgoing calls of a user which is carrying out a DoS 
attack, we would find subsequent short or unestablished 
placed calls and almost no received calls and it is easy to 
predict that this is not the normal usage of a telephone. 
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3 PCA for telephone anomalies 
When we are searching for an anomalous behavior within 
the network, we are probably dealing with a huge amount 
of data-samples described by multivariate features, even 
if these anomalous events occur infrequently. For this 
reason, defining a representative normal behavior is 
challenging and this boundary between normal and 
outlying behaviors, typically not precise, keeps evolving. 
With in mind the possible attacks we can face applying 
an anomaly detection technique, in this chapter we 
introduce a statistical tool able to express the data in such 
a way to highlight their similarities and differences, to 
reduce the dimensionality of the original dataset without 
much loss of information and to adapt itself to the work 
conditions: this software tool is the Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA).  
This technique is the core of the methodology we 
propose in this work.  
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3.1  Principal Component Analysis 
PCA is a coordinate transformation method that maps 
measured data onto a new set of axes, the Principal 
Components (PCs). Each component has the property 
that it points in the direction of maximum variation 
remaining in the data, given the energy already accounted 
for in the preceding components
[6]
.  
As such, the first principal component captures the total 
energy of the original data to the maximum degree 
possible on a single axis. The next succeeding 
components then capture the maximum residual energy 
among the remaining orthogonal directions. In this sense, 
the axes of the new reference system are ordered by the 
amount of energy in the data they are able to collect.  
But how is it possible to compute these Principal 
Components? In Figure 3.1 we show a two dimensional 
dataset and the representation of the eigenvector of the 
covariance matrix C of the dataset itself:  
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Fig. 3.1 Application of PCA to a 2-D dataset 
It is possible to see that the plot of data has quite a strong 
pattern. The two features do indeed increase together. 
The covariance matrix of such a dataset show strong 
cross-correlation between the features, and, accordingly, 
the representation of the eigenvectors of the covariance 
matrix provide us with information about the patterns in 
the dataset itself. As we can see from the blue lines, the 
first eigenvector goes through the middle of the points, 
like drawing a line of best fit. That eigenvector is 
showing how these two features are related along that 
line. The second eigenvector shows the other, less 
important, pattern in the data, that all the points follow 
the main line, but are off to the side of the main line by 
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some amount. So, by this process of taking the 
eigenvectors of the covariance matrix, we have been able 
to extract lines that characterize the data, i.e. the 
Principal Components. 
Generalization to n-dimensions, as in the case of the 
dataset we will use in our context, it is not easy to 
represent in the same graphical way, but works following 
the same principle. 
3.1.1 Computation of the Principal 
 Components 
Shifting from the geometric interpretation to a linear 
algebraic formulation, the computation of the Principal 
Components starts from the evaluation of a dataset. Each 
data-sample of this dataset is described by several 
dimensions, where each dimension represent a particular 
feature with which we evaluate the behavior of the data-
sample itself. For example, in a telephone network each 
data-sample can be a phone user, and each feature can be 
a statistics collected in a particular interval of time 
regarding the use of the phone he has. A possible feature 
can be the number of calls placed in the period under 
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analysis, or their average duration. Given this 
assumption, the description of the whole dataset is done 
through a matrix Q, where each row represents a phone 
user and each column represents a feature.  
In a general case, the dataset Q is: 
        
where X is the number of data-samples in the dataset and 
N the number of features used for their description. 
The PCA is applied to the matrix Q and, as we have 
shown in the preceding sections, transform in a new 
reference system the features used to describe each data-
sample. The obtained PCs are a linear combination of the 
original axes, and are ordered by the quantity of dataset’s 
energy they are able to collect. Starting from the dataset 
Q, it is possible to compute the PCs following two 
different approaches: the covariance method and the 
singular value decomposition.  
Since we will deploy PCA in a distributed environment, 
we only describe the covariance method. Indeed, it is 
possible exploit the different PoPs already present in a 
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telephone network, as shown in [7], through the 
covariance method, parallelizing the computation.  
With this method, the computation of the Principal 
Components is performed through the following steps:  
1. Computation of the empirical mean of each column: 
        
 
 
       
 
   
 
      at the end of this step, µ is a 1×N row vector. 
2. Subtraction of the mean from the correspondent 
column: 
        
      where h is a column vector X×1 of 1’s and B at the 
end of the step is an X×N matrix. 
3. Computation of the empirical covariance matrix of B: 
  
 
 
     
at the end of this step C is an N×N matrix. 
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4. Computation of eigenvalues v and eigenvectors g of 
the covariance matrix C. The number of features 
used, and accordingly the dimensionality of C, can be 
at most in the hundreds, and any method we choose 
to evaluate the eigenvector and the eigenvalues make 
this step less computationally heavy compared to the 
preceding ones. Indeed in that case we are dealing 
with matrices large proportionally to our dataset. 
5. Sorting the eigenvectors g by the decreasing order of 
the correspondent eigenvalues, i.e. the quantity of 
energy of the dataset they are able to collect. V and G 
store the eigenvector and the eigenvalues in the new 
order. 
V represents the new basis for the starting matrix B, and 
its columns are the Principal Components we are 
searching for, ordered by the energy of the dataset they 
are able to collect. 
3.1.2 Mapping the data-samples 
Given the new reference system, expressed with the 
matrix V, it’s possible to map all the data-samples in the 
new reference system through the following equation: 
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where each row of B’ represents the data-samples in the 
reference system described by the Principal Components. 
For example, a final result can be the one shown by 
Fig.3.2: 
 
Fig. 3.2 Mapping of Data-samples through PCA 
If it is possible to find a pattern within the dataset, the 
first Principal Components can represent each data-
sample with a small loss of information because they are 
able to collect almost the entire energy within the dataset. 
The pattern shared by the majority of the data-sample is 
the common behavior of the network, and for this reason, 
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the first PCs are what we claim to be the legitimate 
profile. 
This is the case of the preceding picture, where a single 
PC is able to characterize the whole dataset. The 
subspace obtained from the first PCs is also known as the 
normal subspace. Conversely, a data-sample that has a 
different behavior from the pattern described by the 
normal subspace needs also the last Principal 
Components to be well characterized. The subspace 
described from these PCs is also called the anomalous 
subspace.  
From this sentence, it follows a way to identify data-
samples that acts as outliers. In literature, the error made 
approximating data-samples with a small number of PCs 
is called Squared Prediction Error (SPE) and represents 
their energy into the anomalous subspace. For this 
reason, the SPE discriminate if a data-sample follow or 
not the pattern described by the normal subspace. If we 
use the matrix PC to contain the first P Principal 
Components, the SPE can be evaluated with the 
following equation: 
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where PC is an N×P matrix. Using a dataset with the 
subtraction of the averages of each column is a 
fundamental part to minimize the SPE.  
In previous work where Principal Component Analysis 
was employed, the tests used to choose the number of 
PCs that describe the normal subspace were quite 
different. Among several other tests we have tried
[11]
, 
such as the Cattel’s Scree Test, the empirical 3  method 
proposed by Lakhina in [3], the Humphrey-Ilgen parallel 
analysis and the Broken Stick method, in this section we 
present the only one that had successful results in our 
context: the “Cumulative percentage of Total 
Variation
[6]”. The chosen method computes the 
cumulative percentage of energy contained within the 
first P eigenvectors with the following equation: 
      
         
         
 
(remember that G contains the value of the ordered 
eigenvalues, corresponding to the variance collected 
within the correspondent PC). The number of PCs of the 
normal subspace is the first P able to collect at least a 
32 
 
fixed percentage of the total. In our methodology we set 
this percentage with a Montecarlo simulation
[14]
 to a 95% 
value. 
3.2  Dataset Description 
Thanks to the collaboration with a small European 
telecom operator, we had the possibility to evaluate the 
application of PCA in a telephone environment over a 
dataset composed by 30 millions of calls, collected in a 
period of five consecutive weeks. In average, we 
obtained 148K active users each day. The calls were in 
form of anonymized Call Detail Records (CDR), whose 
structure is represented in Fig. 3.3.  
 
Fig. 3.3 Call Detail Records 
For each call, a CDR contains information such as the 
source and destination phone number (at least one of the 
interpreter of each call was an user of the operator that 
collected the calls), the time the call started, the call 
duration as well as the cause code or response code, 
which indicates whether the call was established or if an 
33 
 
error occurred. Even if CDRs were from VoIP as well as 
PSTN networks, this field was given accordingly to SIP 
reply codes
[8]
.  
In our analysis, we interpreted each replay code as a 
particular status for the correspond call: 
Call Status Reply Code 
Normal 200,408,486 
Suspicious 4XX 
Network error 5XX,6XX 
We considered a call ending as normal if the code was 
successful, if the called user did not answer in time or 
was already busy in a conversation. We considered a call 
ending as suspicious if there was any other client failure. 
We considered a call ending with network error if there 
was a server or global failure in the network. 
In our trials, for each day, CDRs were grouped by users 
and we evaluated the behavior of each user extracting the 
following N=10 features: 
 number of calls: placed and received; 
 number of established calls: placed and received (i.e., 
calls with a duration greater than zero); 
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 number of calls suspicious and with network errors; 
 number of distinct callers and distinct callees: total 
and on established calls only. 
These features were inspired by previous works on 
analysis of phone data
[9]
. The reason behind considering 
a per-user set of features lays in the fact that our goal was 
to identify users responsible for anomalous calls rather 
than in detecting the anomalous calls itself. Under this 
respect, we believed that the choice of an observation 
window of one day was a reasonable trade-off between 
the promptness of the anomaly detection mechanism and 
the ability to gather user’s behavior with respect to the 
chosen features.  
3.3  Telephone network: application 
 scenario 
Telephone networks commonly follow a hierarchical 
topology, where users connect to the network through 
Points of Presence and interconnecting switches ensure 
the communication between PoPs. In Fig.3.4 can 
represent a possible infrastructure of a telephone 
network. 
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Fig. 3.4 Possible Topology of a Telephone Network 
Each PoP is in charge for a specific geographical area 
and for a set of users which is almost stable over time. 
This topology allows scalability as the number of users 
and the volume of traffic within the network increase.  
In general, even if in the network there are already probes 
with a partial visibility of the network itself, an anomaly 
detection technique relies on a central node that collects 
all the information needed, and directly applies the 
detection of the anomalous traffic to the raw data. This 
solution suffers of different drawbacks:  
 it does not exploit the PoPs already present in the 
network; 
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 requires the transport of a huge and sensitive amount 
of data through the network; 
 presents a single point of failure which can become 
itself target of attacks. 
With the assumption that the PoPs just mentioned in a 
telephone network are able to collect the CDRs both for 
the incoming and outgoing calls, regarding the set users 
of their telecomm operator they are in charge of, we 
present in the following sections two different application 
of Principal Component Analysis in a telephone 
environment: an anomaly detection technique that 
exploits the different PoPs to parallelize the computation 
of PCs, but still centralizes the raw data and the 
identification of the anomalous users; our anomaly 
detection technique, where a PoP that observes traffic of 
its users and records information about their calls, 
identifies directly the anomalous users, only receiving the 
description of the normal subspace of the other probes 
within the network from a central orchestrator. With our 
solution we solve part of the problems a centralized 
technique has. Indeed, we avoid the transportation of the 
raw data within the network, we exploit all the present 
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PoPs and we distribute the decision over the behavior of 
the single user, reducing the importance of the central 
node in the anomaly detection architecture. 
3.4 Centralized PCA-based anomaly 
detection technique 
As we have seen in the preceding sections, Principal 
Component Analysis is able to point out data-samples 
that do not follow the general behavior of the dataset, i.e. 
what we claim to be the legitimate user profile.  
In the first approach we propose, we apply the PCA in a 
central node to a matrix Q where each row represents one 
of the user present within the entire network, and each 
column is one of the feature we extracted from the CDRs 
following the process described in section 3.2. 
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3.4.1 Parallelization of the computation of 
 PCs 
Gathering the Principal Components of a matrix like Q 
(on average in our context a 150K×10 matrix) is 
computationally heavy due to the calculation of its 
covariance matrix. For this reason, even if the decisions 
are taken centralizing all the information from the probes, 
we found interesting to parallelize the computation of the 
covariance matrix, thus of the Principal Components.  
As we said before, the empirical covariance matrix of a 
generic array Q in general can be computed through the 
equation: 
  
 
 
         
 
where X is the number of row of Q and µ is an arrow 
vector containing the averages of the columns of Q. 
Following what we found in [7], it’s possible to gather 
the same results with the subsequent steps: 
1. Evaluation of the number of row (X) and of the 
averages (µ) of the columns of matrix Q. 
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2. Horizontal split of the original matrix Q into n 
subsets. It’s not important that the subsets obtained 
have the same number of row, as we can see from 
Fig. 3.5. 
 
Fig. 3.5 Splitting B 
3. For each subset Xi, evaluation of the partial result: 
          
     
4. Obtaining the covariance matrix by summing and 
normalizing the partial results:  
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If we consider the subset Xi as the subset a probe can 
obtain observing its part of the network, it’s possible to 
use this procedure to parallelize the computation of the 
covariance matrix C, even maintaining the anomaly 
detection stage in the central node. In regard to the 
scenario of our context, the exchange of messages we 
deserve to make it work can be resumed thanks to 
Fig.3.6. 
 
Fig 3.6 Parallelize the computation of C 
1. each probe evaluates the number of user Xsub-i of its 
subset, computes the sum of each column of Xi and 
store them in µpar-i; 
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2. each probe sends Xi, Xsub-i and µpar-I to the central 
node; 
3. while each probe computes CovPari, the central 
nodes computes the total number of users in the 
dataset and the array of the averages of each column: 
         
 
   
   
 
 
       
 
   
 
4. each probe sends CovPari to the central node; 
5. the central node gathers C (a 10×10 matrix), its 
eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Sorting the eigenvectors by 
the correspondent eigenvalue, the central node gathers the 
Principal Components, i.e. matrices V and array G. 
Experimental results proved that in our context the parallelized 
approach is able to obtain the same results of the centralized 
approach, saving up to the 95% of the time. 
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Fig.3.7 Computational time for C 
We tested the time needed to compute the covariance 
matrix without considering the transport of the 
information between the probes and the central node. We 
chose this solution because both approaches almost send 
the same information through the network and we can 
consider this time as a constant. In the trials of the 
parallelized approach, each probe had a visibility of 
around 10K users, and this means that increasing the 
number of users in the network requires more probes. 
As we supposed previously, the computation of the PCs 
from the covariance matrix C only represents a small 
percentage of the total computational time. 
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3.4.2 Anomaly detection stage 
At the end of the computation of the PCs, whatever 
approach we decide to implement, the central node ends 
up with the Principal Components and the original 
dataset Q. Following the steps described in section 3.1, 
the central node is able to split the new reference system 
described by the PCs into the normal and anomalous 
subspaces thanks to the cumulative percentage method, 
to map onto the two subspaces all the active users within 
the network in the day under analysis and to evaluate the 
SPE characterizing the approximation made choosing a 
subset of the available PCs. Thanks to a Montecarlo 
simulation, we evaluate a threshold T for the energy of 
the users within the anomalous subspace and we label as 
anomalous all the users that exceed the given threshold.  
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4 A distributed PCA-based 
approach in a telephone 
network 
A centralized technique, as the one just proposed, suffers 
of several drawbacks, as we already mentioned. In 
addition, an anomaly detection technique that exploits the 
Principal Component Analysis also suffers from the 
pollution of the legitimate profile. Indeed, if a small 
number of outliers in the dataset act completely different 
from the common behaviors of the data-samples, the 
PCA will gather Principal Components biased towards 
this anomalous behavior
[10]
. Therefore, also the labeling 
of each data-sample will result biased.  
For this reasons, in this chapter we propose a new 
methodology that tries to solve this problem, gathering 
the legitimate-user profile avoiding the outliers from 
being part of the computation of the PCs.  
4.1 Pollution of the legitimate-profile 
To understand how the PCA is sensible to the pollution, 
we propose a simple graphical example with Fig.4.1. 
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Fig. 4.1 Pollution of PCs 
In the simple dataset shown in the picture, we used two 
features to describe the data-samples. Even if only the 
4% of the data-samples acts in a different way compared 
to the visible pattern revealed, the first Principal 
Component is almost in the middle of the two groups. As 
we already mentioned, it’s clear how an anomaly 
detection technique that labels the data-samples as 
anomalous with a huge energy in the anomalous 
subspace (in this case the one described by the second 
PC), can make wrong decision due to the biased 
representation of the new reference system obtained. 
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4.2 The methodology 
Considering the same scenario we present in the 
centralized approach, in our methodology the process of 
gathering the legitimate user profile still relies on the 
communication between a central node and the PoPs. 
This exchange tries to gather and apply to the dataset PCs 
free of pollution. 
 
Fig. 4.2 Graphical summary of the methodology 
To achieve such a result, we will follow the subsequent 
steps: at first, each PoP applies the PCA to its subset of 
users to gather the description of the normal subspace, 
and sends such description to the central node; the central 
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node than applies an AHC algorithm to identify a subset 
of users considered free of pollution and computes the 
legitimate-user profile; eventually, each PoP receives the 
profile and performs PCA-based anomaly detection 
within its subset of users.  
4.2.1 Probe side: PCA analysis 
Given Xp users and the N features we decided to extract 
from the CDRs, each probe p performs PCA on the 
matrix Qp =  Xp× N, as shown in section 3.1. At the end 
of the process, each probe gather its own PCs, that 
represent a snapshot of the behaviors of the users they 
serve, and splits the new reference system into the 
normal and anomalous subspaces with the cumulative 
percentage method. As in the centralized approach, the 
first Lp components able to collect the 95% of the energy 
of the dataset are chosen to describe the normal subspace. 
Eventually, each probe sends to the central node the 
following information: 
 the matrix V, which contains all the PCs of the 
subset, the number of components Lp that describe 
the normal subspace and the array G, which contains 
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the ordered eigenvalues of Qp. This type of 
information is used to find similarities within the new 
reference systems obtained by the probes. 
 the number of users of its own subset Xp, the sum of 
the column of Qp, i.e. µp, and its partial Covariance 
Matrix CovParp. This information is the same we 
used in a previous section to parallelize the 
computation of the covariance matrix of the whole 
dataset, and it will be useful in following steps to 
obtain in the central point the PCs of the dataset we 
consider free of pollution without any approximation, 
although the central node does not have the raw data.  
4.2.2 Central node side: gathering the 
 legitimate  user profile 
The goal of this step is to identify the community of 
probes, which encloses the description of legitimate 
users. The supposition made is that probes that do not 
contain outliers act in the average in the same way and 
have similar PCs that describe the normal subspace (we 
will call them PCp) even if they only see different parts 
of the network. We decide to evaluate how the PCp are 
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similar and discover the “clean” community through an 
Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering algorithm. In the 
following, we refer to such community as CN.  
Hierarchical clustering mechanism is proven to work 
well when coupled with outlier detection techniques
[4]
. 
AHC creates a hierarchy of clusters, which may be 
represented in a tree structure called dendrogram, 
following a bottom-up approach. The leaves of the tree 
correspond to each individual probe and the root consists 
of a single cluster containing all the probes. The 
algorithm starts from the leaves and successively a series 
of merging operations follows that eventually forces all 
the probes into the same cluster. The choice of the 
clusters to merge is determined by a linkage criterion, 
which is a function of the pair wise distances between 
observations: in our case, we use a Weighted Euclidean 
Distance metric to evaluate how different the PCs of the 
probes are.  
Given M probes, the central node computes the mutual 
Euclidean distance between the PCp of one probe 
towards the PC of the other M-1 probes following these 
steps: 
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 in case the probes have a different number of 
components describing the normal subspace, the 
central node computes the distances between the 
probes considering a number of PCs equal to L = 
maxp=1,…M{ Lp }. 
 considering the PCs mutually orthonormal, the 
central node computes for each possible couple of 
probes, only the Euclidean distance of PCs that 
belong to the same column of matrix V, i.e. it 
computes dj(PCp,PCq), the distance between the j-th 
components of the probes p and the j-th components 
of the probes q.  
 due to the fact that the more the energy a PC is able 
to collect, the more the behavior it is describing is 
present within the dataset, we decide to give to the 
first components more importance in the computation 
of the total distance between the PCp of different 
probes. For this reason, the mutual Euclidean distance 
between two probes is computed as follows: 
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where     represent the average percentage of energy 
the    j-th component counts for in the couple of 
probes we are analyzing on the total energy of their 
normal subspace. The computation of     is made 
through the following equation: 
    
        
           
 
   
  
Given such computation, the maximum Euclidean 
Distance between probes is   . 
Once the central node has computed the Euclidean 
distance between all probes, the AHC algorithm 
aggregates the pair of probes that exhibit the minimum 
mutual distance into one cluster. The distance between 
this new cluster and a given probe is then the average of 
the distances between the probe and each member of the 
cluster:  
                       
 
 
     
 
   
                 
 
   
              
The algorithm iterates joining probes until one of the 
following two conditions are reached: the mutual 
Euclidean distance between clusters is over a given 
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threshold S, or all the M probes are grouped into one 
single cluster. 
An example of how a dendrogram can be in our context, 
considering 20 probes and a given threshold S as stop 
condition follows in Fig. 4.3. 
 
Fig.4.3 Example of a Dendrogram 
In our methodology, the threshold S is set to the average 
of the minimum Euclidean distances between a given 
probe towards the other: 
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When AHC returns, the cluster that contains the majority 
of probes is defined as the community CN, while the 
remaining probes belong to the community of outsiders 
called CA. The supposition behind this decision is that the 
outliers, or group of outliers, changes the description of 
the normal subspace each in a different way and the 
biggest group that acts in the same way is free of 
pollution. By the way, we will see in the following 
section how to avoid taking the wrong community in the 
case a huge number of outliers of the same species affect 
the description of the normal subspace of several probes. 
At this point the central node gathers the description of 
the legitimate-user profile, by computing the PCs that 
describe the normal subspace of CN, namely PCN. The 
computation is performed starting from the covariance 
matrix C of the probes belonging to the clean 
community, based on the information already sent by its 
probes: 
  
 
  
         
 
   
   
     
 
All this information is already present in the central node, 
and can be gathered with the following computation: 
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   . 
In this way, the PCN are obtained without sending the 
raw data to the central node and without any 
approximation. From the covariance matrix all the PCs of 
the clean community are easily computed through the 
determination of its eigenvectors and eigenvalues. As for 
the single probe, also in this case the number of PCs 
representative of the normal subspace is chosen by using 
the cumulative percentage method and 95% of the total 
energy of CN as the minimum amount of energy it has to 
collect. It is worth noting that this new set of PCs better 
describe the legitimate user profile with respect to those 
computed by the single probes, given that it is computed 
on a more complete set of normal users.  
Hence, the central node distributes back to the probes the 
PCN, together with the value of the threshold S, the array 
GN and the averages   . This kind of information is sent 
because the probes will use them to perform a cross-
check of the profile being gathered. 
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4.2.3 Community check: the Joining Phase 
Before performing anomaly detection, each probe checks 
whether the profile actually corresponds to one of 
legitimate users. Indeed, it may happen that the AHC 
algorithm chooses the wrong community, even if this 
community represents the bigger community within the 
network. In fact, it is possible that probes with a 
widespread type of outliers have similar PCs, that they 
are grouped in the same community and, in a period of 
time where the number of outliers is not negligible and 
the CN counts for a small number of probes, which this 
type of anomalous community becomes the bigger 
community within the network. In this case, the 
particular type of outliers characterizing the subset of 
probes wrongly chosen as CN will pollute the 
computation of PCs and they will go completely 
undetected in the anomaly detection stage. 
To prevent this problem each probe belonging to CA 
performs the following scheme: 
1. compute the SPE of their own users, normalizing 
them by the averages of the column of CN, i.e.   , 
and mapping them onto the received profile: 
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where h is a column vector Xp×1 of 1’s; 
2. sort users by their SPE; 
3. discard the user with the highest energy accordingly 
to the legitimate profile received; 
4. compute their own PCp without considering 
discarded users; 
5. if the mutual distance between PCN and PCp, 
computed as: 
               
  
   
             
where    is the number of PCs of the normal 
subspace of CN, is bigger than S go to step 2; 
6. the probe successfully joined the clean community. 
In case the central node gathers a polluted profile, i.e. CN 
contains widespread anomalies, probes without that kind 
of anomaly will not obtain PCp that satisfies the 
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condition of Step 5 and an unsuccessful joining phase 
reveals that. 
At the end of this phase the probes communicate to the 
central node whether they were able to join CN or not. In 
case of failure, the central node picks the next-largest 
community identified by AHC as CN, computes its PCs 
and sends them with the additional information 
mentioned before to the probes. The probes belonging to 
the new CA repeat the joining phase. If the joining is still 
unsuccessful, the central node increases the threshold S 
by the 10% and repeats the procedure, until all the probes 
send a positive feedback about the profile PCN. Note that 
in case S reaches the maximum d(PCp,PCN), all probes 
are grouped into one cluster, and our method becomes 
equivalent to the centralized approach. In Fig.4.4 we 
show a case where all the probes erroneously belonging 
to CA not able to join the “clean” community. 
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Fig.4.4 Wrong CN detection 
As we can see from the picture, the Euclidean Distance 
grows instead of decreasing when we remove the most 
“anomalous” users, meaning that they are not able to 
gather the same common behavior of CN. 
Thanks to this procedure we are also able to avoid 
problems when the threshold S is too low and a small 
number of probes is not able to reach such grade of 
similarity with CN. In Fig.4.5 there is a case where this 
happened, with only two probes not able to reach the low 
threshold S. 
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Fig.4.5 Unsuccessful joining phase towards the correct CN 
In general, if CN is chosen correctly all the probes reach 
the same PCs removing a small number of users and the 
joining phase successful ends, as in the case we show in 
Fig.4.6. 
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Fig. 4.6 Successful joining phase 
4.2.4 Probe Side: Anomaly detection 
When the central node receives the successful feedback 
from all the probes, sends back an acknowledgment to 
the probes and the anomaly detection stage starts. Note 
that all the probes can exploit the PCN they already have. 
This anomaly detection stage serves the purpose of 
detecting the users responsible for anomalous behaviors 
in phone traffic, based on the profile gathered at the 
central node with the procedure just presented. 
During this phase, each probe, even the probes belonging 
to CN, maps its subset of users onto the PCN, and 
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computes their energy into the anomalous subspace. This 
operation corresponds to computing the following SPE 
for each user: 
                           
   . 
The probes then compare the SPE of each user with a 
threshold value Tp, which is set by each probe by means 
of Montecarlo simulations, and label all users with a 
        as anomalous. 
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5  Experimental Results 
To apply our methodology to a distributed scenario as 
described in Chapter 4 from the available data, users that 
appear in the first day under analysis have been randomly 
split among a typical number of probes that a telecomm 
operator can have, i.e. 20 probes. In the following days, 
the same association user-probe is kept if the user is 
present the days before, otherwise we randomly assign it 
to one of the probes. In this way, we end up with 
approximately 8K users for each probe. 
For each day, we compute the matrix Qp of each probe, 
and consequently the description of the normal subspace 
PCp, by following the procedure outlined in the previous 
chapter. 
In the first part of this chapter we will show the results of 
our methodology related to one initial random 
assignment between users and probes. In the second part 
of this chapter we will show the comparison of those 
results to the one obtained from the centralized PCA-
based approach. However, experiments were repeated by 
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randomly varying the initial assignments, verifying that 
the reported considerations hold. 
5.1 Numerical evaluation of the Distributed
 anomaly detection technique 
In this section we propose the numerical results we 
obtained with the distributed methodology proposed. 
To avoid showing repetitive results, in this section we 
only use the most interesting week of the five available 
ones. 
5.1.1 Probe side: PCA analysis 
In our simulation, each day the probes present in the 
network started this phase extracting from the CDRs the 
features we decide to use regarding incoming and 
outgoing calls of the users it is in charge of.  
To decide to which day a call placed across two different 
days belongs, we use the lasting timer as assignment 
parameter. If the interpreters of the call under analysis 
belong to the telecom operator, the same call is 
considered both in the computation of the statistics 
concerning the incoming calls of the callees, and in the 
computation of the statistics of the outgoing calls of the 
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callers. If only one of the interpreters belongs to the 
telecomm operator, the call is only used to evaluate the 
statistics of the internal user. Also evaluating the 
statistics of the external user can be misleading because 
we only have partial visibility of their behavior, i.e. their 
interaction with the internal users of our telecomm 
operator. 
 
At the end of the feature extraction phase, each probe 
ends up with its Qp, and following the procedure 
illustrated in the previous chapter, computes its own PCp. 
To compare how different the local PCs  in this initial 
stage for the week under analysis is, we show Table 5.1. 
Day 
Average 
           
Maximum 
           
Max 
#PCs 
Norm. 
Subspace 
Threshold 
S for 
AHC  
Monday 0.258 0.629 4 0.118 
Tuesday 0.287 0.622 4 0.139 
Wednesday 0.333 0.578 5 0.128 
Thursday 0.360 0.559 5 0.129 
Friday 0.333 0.585 5 0.143 
Saturday 0.382 0.775 5 0.144 
Sunday 0.419 0.674 5 0.150 
Tab.5.1 Starting condition 
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As we can see from the table, each day presents at least a 
couple of probes that gathers PCs for the normal 
subspace completely different from each other (near the 
50% of the maximum possible). In general, this 
difference is due to a few users present in one of the two 
probes acting differently from the legitimate behavior, 
i.e. the behavior shown from the majority of the users, 
and it is a demonstration of how easily the computation 
of the PCs can be polluted.  
On the other hand, the threshold set from the AHC 
algorithm for the determination of the clean community 
is very low if compared to the average distance shown 
from the probes. For this reason, only probes with a high 
degree of similarity can be part of CN. 
In Fig.5.1 we show the situation of the Weighted 
Euclidean Distance between the probes in the day of the 
week where the PCs are in average more distant from 
each other, i.e. Sunday. 
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Fig. 5.1 Heat map - Initial Condition 
In this heat map the distance between probes is shown 
through colors. The cold colors represent probes with 
PCs very similar to each other, instead the hot colors 
represent probe with very different PCs.  
Even in this day where the PCs are in average different 
from a probe to another, the heat map points out 
interesting patterns. There are clusters of several probes 
where the mutual distance d(PCp,PCq) is towards zero, 
suggesting that those probes have a similar description of 
the normal subspace. For this reason, they represent a 
single community during the AHC algorithm since they 
have users that act in general in the same way. However, 
67 
 
some probes differ from all others and result in a yellow 
stripe in the heat map (e.g. probe number 11). Finally, 
there are probes which share a similar description of their 
normal subspace, but such description differs from the 
behavior described by the majority of the probes: a 
yellow stripe interleaved by blue square is the visual 
representation of such pattern. Even though this type of 
probes does not count for the majority of the probes, they 
will be a single community too under the AHC 
algorithm. 
5.1.2 Gathering the legitimate profile 
Thanks to the methodology, the central node have 
gathered every day a community where each probes is 
able to join before the distributed technique becomes 
equal to the centralized one, i.e. the probes is considered 
as a single cluster. In Table 5.2 we show the results for 
the same week presented in the preceding section.  
  
68 
 
Day 
Maximum 
           
Probes 
ϵ CN 
Number 
PCs 
Norm. 
Subspace 
PCN 
Monday 0.091 9 3 
Tuesday 0.080 9 3 
Wednesday 0.095 6 4 
Thursday 0.136 4 4 
Friday 0.065 3 4 
Saturday 0.091 8 4 
Sunday 0.073 3 4 
Tab 5.2 Situation after all probes join CN 
As we can see from the table, after the “joining of the 
community phase” each probe is very close to the PCs 
gathered from the CN community. This means that in 
every day we are able to gather a general description of 
the behavior of the users that can be found in each probe, 
i.e. the legitimate profile. If we compare the PCs 
gathered from each probes to the one gathered from the 
other probes at the final stage of the procedure we can 
find a situation as the one in Fig.5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Final stage gathering legitimate profile 
The PCs gathered from each probe during the “joining 
phase” are not only similar to the PCs of the CN, as we 
can see also from the last line of the picture where PCN is 
reported, but also to each other. 
It is also possible to see that in general less than the 50% 
of the probes belong to the clean community. This means 
that at least the 50% of the probes gathers a polluted 
description of the normal subspace in the initial stage, but 
is able to point out the users responsible for this 
pollution.  
Finally, to collect the 95% of the energy, the clean 
community needs a smaller number of PCs. Indeed, only 
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considering the users that follow the legitimate profile 
make easier the description of the normal subspace 
through the Principal Component Analysis. 
But what is the legitimate user profile gathered during 
this stage? Each day the methodology computes the PCN 
based to the behavior of the users it is analyzing, and in 
general we obtain different snapshots for different days. 
What is interesting is that the first PCs of the clean 
community is fundamentally stable in the five weeks, and 
let us analyze the nature of the legitimate profile. 
 
Tab. 5.3 Evaluation of first PCN 
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From Table 5.3, the first PC is able to collect more than 
the 50% of the whole normal subspace. Considering that 
the PCs are the orthonormal directions composing the 
new reference system gathered through PCA, the sum of 
the square weights of each feature is the same if it is done 
through the 10 PCs, so how much a feature is present in 
the normal subspace, the more this feature will be well 
approximated only using this description. For this reason, 
according to our dataset and the partial representation of 
the normal subspace shown, we find that legitimate-users 
can place and establish a number of calls that spans over 
a wide range and towards a number of callees that can 
vary, while his number of received calls, their 
establishment ratio and the number of callers has to be 
close to the average of the dataset. 
This representation of the normal subspace shows that 
most of the variability of our dataset is due to active 
features. 
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5.1.3 Anomaly Detection stage 
As we said in the preceding chapter, to perform anomaly 
detection, we order the users by the energy they have in 
the anomalous subspace after mapping them onto the 
PCN and we perform a Montecarlo simulation for each 
probe, even for the probes belonging to CN, to set a 
threshold Tp to discriminate between legitimate and 
anomalous users.  
At the end of this stage we inspect the characteristic of 
the users labeled as anomalous and we discover that most 
of them act as well-known malicious users or that they 
are enduring an attack. Remember that we are working in 
an unsupervised scenario, without any kind of ground 
truth, except 4 telemarketers confirmed by the telecomm 
operator. 
All the users pointed out in this phase can be profiled in 
the following eight major behaviors: 
 users that place almost all the calls where they are 
involved (at least 90% out of the total), with a low 
percentage of establishment (at most 30% of the calls 
placed, but in general under the 10%) and towards a 
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few number of callees (at most the 20% of unique 
callees on the total number of calls placed). This are 
statistics that can be found when an attacker is 
carrying out a DoS attack, i.e. he is repeatedly calling 
the same user to put out of order its terminal or 
making him stop answering. 
 users that place almost all the calls where they are 
involved in (at least 90% out of the total), with a 
percentage of establishment near the 50% towards a 
big number of callees (at least the 75% out of the 
total number of calls placed). This statistics are 
similar to the ones belonging to the only ground truth 
we had, i.e. 4 telemarketers confirmed by the 
telecomm operator, that our methodology was able to 
always point out when they were active during the 
period under analysis. 
 users that place almost all the calls where they are 
involved in (at least 90% out of the totals), with a 
high percentage of establishment (at least 80% of the 
calls placed) towards few callees (less than 20% if 
compared to the number of placed calls). This type of 
behaviors seems to be anomalous but not critical. Due 
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to the fact that those users count for at least 50 to 700 
calls placed every day, however this profile shows 
strong relationship between users. 
 users with a received out of places call ratio of at 
least 90%, with a low percentage of establishment 
(30%) from few callers (less than 10% compared to 
the number of received calls). This type of profile can 
appear in the case a user is under a DoS attack, as 
said before. 
 users with a received out of places call ratio of at 
least 90%, with a percentage of establishment less 
than the 20%, from a big number of callers (at least 
the 50% compared to the total number of calls 
received). This type of statistics is the same we can 
found when a user is under a DDoS attack. 
Differently from the previous profile, more than one 
user starts calling the same callees, involving all its 
available resources. 
 users with a received out of places call ratio of at 
least 90% with a high percentage of established call 
from a big number of callers (respectively at least 
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80% and 60% out of the total calls received).This is a 
typical behavior a call-center can have. 
 users with a received out of places call ratio of at 
least 90%, with a high percentage of establishments 
(at least 80%) from few callers (less than 10% out of 
the calls received). Also in this case users are 
anomalous but probably not malicious. 
 users with at least 20 calls with network error calls or 
ending with a suspicious code. This kind of users can 
represent a problem within the network. 
In Table 5.4 we report the number of users for each 
profile pointed out in the week we are discussing. 
Profile # of users 
DoS victim 40 
DDoS victim 11 
Call Center 12 
Bugged User 55 
User Bugger 14 
DoS attacker 129 
Telemarketer 11 
Network problem 63 
Tab.5.4 Anomalous users pointed out 
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The number of DoS attacks and DoS victims, such as the 
number of bugged users and user buggers differs because 
we do not compute statistics of external users to the 
considered network. All the users, except for the one 
expressing network problems, are also shown in more 
detail in Fig.5.3. 
 
 
Fig. 5.3 Calls received versus Calls placed anomalous users 
In this first figure we see that the anomalous users follow 
two main big profiles: a user that places all the calls 
where he is involved; a user that receives all the calls 
where he is involved. There are not anomalous users that 
share the number of calls where they are involved equally 
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between calls placed or received, i.e. the type of behavior 
we can foresee to be the normal usage of a phone. 
Another interesting characteristic is that all the 
anomalous users are at least involved in 50 calls. 
In Fig. 5.4 and 5.5 we represent the users in two different 
planes: we show the establishment rate and unique callers 
for the passive users and the establishment rate and 
unique callees for the active users. 
 
Fig.5.4 Description of Passive anomalous 
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Fig. 5.5 Description of anomalous active users 
In both pictures it is clear that the clustering of the 
anomalous users correspond to different behavior of the 
users pointed out. 
Considering the profiles pointed out from the distributed   
PCA-approach, we search for them also into the users 
with a SPE under the threshold Tp, i.e. the users 
belonging to the legitimate profile. In this analysis we 
have actually found users with the same profile of the 
anomalous users, but involved in general in a smaller 
number of calls compared to the ones pointed out in the 
anomaly detection stage. Accordingly to this, PCA 
assigns energy in the anomalous subspace to users 
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following the same behavior proportionally to the 
number of calls they are involved in.  
We conclude this section showing the comparison of the 
PCs of the clean community with or without the 
anomalous users we point out in the anomaly detection 
stage. Indeed, as said previously, in the clean community 
there are also sparse anomalous users that affect slightly 
the computation of PCN. Analyzing the Weighted 
Euclidean Distance between PCs computed considering 
or not the anomalous users contained within CN, we 
obtain the results shown in Fig.5.6. 
 
Fig.5.6 Comparison PCs of CN considering or not anomalous 
users 
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As we can see from the picture, except for the peak 
registered the forth Monday of the period, we have found 
a difference at most of the 3% of the maximum distance 
we can obtain. 
It is this result, with inherent implementation difficulties, 
that prevent us from computing and applying the PCN of 
the clean community after cleaning them of its 
anomalous users as the legitimate user profile in the 
detection stage. 
5.1.4 The importance of the Joining Phase 
Thanks to the “Joining Phase” we are able to prevent a 
wrong selection of the clean community. In this section 
we will show an example of the possible anomalous 
behavior that the biggest community can contains. 
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Fig.5.7 Prevent the wrong community selection 
Gathering the PCN from the biggest community of the 
dendrogram in Fig.5.7, no probe is able to join it. 
Analyzing this community after mapping all the users 
with its own PCs, we are able to point out only 2 users 
belonging to the profile described in the previous section. 
Removing those users, the PCs of the normal subspace 
do not change (the change is less than 1%) and there is 
not the joining of the other probes even after this 
recalculation. 
Performing our procedure, we obtain as the clean 
community the next-largest community and every single 
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probe, even the ones belonging to the biggest 
community, is able to join it. To evaluate how different 
are the PCs obtained, we compute the Weighted 
Euclidean Distance between the PCs of the two 
community and we obtain a distance of 0.3 (almost the 
20% of the maximum possible). Applying the PCN to the 
biggest community we have found several anomalous 
users that are completely undetected applying its clean 
PCs. Those users belong to the profiles of Table 5.5. 
Profile # of users 
User Bugger 2 
DoS attacker 4 
Telemarketer 1 
Network problem 1 
Tab. 5.5 Anomalous users biggest community 
Without those users, all with active anomalous behavior, 
the PCs of the biggest community reduce of a 50% their 
distance to PCN, meaning that evaluated as a whole, 
those users are able to heavily affect the computation of 
the normal subspace.  
We keep evaluating the behavior of the users under the 
threshold of the biggest community and we have found 
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16 other users belonging to the active profile that are not 
detected neither with our distributed approach. Those 
users are involved in at most 50 calls but, even if our 
methodology does not consider them as anomalous users, 
evaluating the PCs of the biggest community also 
without them the result is that the two couples of clean 
PCs are nearly equal. 
Even if we are not able to find such a case in our 
analysis, there is a possible situation where also our 
joining phase fails. Indeed, if the same anomalous 
behavior is spread within every probe of the network, it is 
not possible to gather a description of the normal 
subspace free of pollution. Furthermore, due to the fact 
that the widespread anomalies is part of the common 
behavior of the network, each probes can gather similar, 
even if not clean, PCs  and the joining phase is not even 
able to point out this situation. 
5.2 Comparison against the centralized 
 approach 
In this section we provide a comparison between our 
approach and the centralized one. We compare the two 
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approaches in terms of the anomalous profile detected 
and of stability over time of the computed principal 
components. 
5.2.1 Profiling of anomalous users 
For each day, we compute the Euclidean distance 
between the PCs describing the normal subspace in the 
centralized and distributed approach. The results shown 
in Fig.5.8 are for the trial we have also reported in the 
previous sections. 
 
Fig.5.8 Difference between PCN and the PCs of the whole set of 
users 
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The Euclidean Distance between the PCs gathered is 
evaluated considering the number of PCs for the normal 
subspace of the clean community. There are several days 
where the centralized approach needs more PCs of the 
clean community to collect the 95% of the energy of the 
dataset, and in those days the representation of its normal 
subspace change even more of what the Euclidean 
Distance shows. By the way, it is possible observe a 
difference between PCs describing the normal subspace 
between the 5% and the 40% of maximum we can 
achieve, that is     
To inspect the impact of such distance, we consider first 
of all the users pointed out in the anomalous detection 
stage from the distributed approach and check their 
energy in the centralized approach. On average, the 
profiles have a variation of the energy in the anomalous 
subspace that can be resumed by Table 5.6. 
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Tab.5.6 Variation energy for anomalous users in anomalous 
subspace 
Note that the total energy of the users is the same in both 
approaches, as PCA maps the data into a rotated 
reference system which conserves the energy of each 
sample. Therefore, if the same sample has a lower energy 
in the anomalous subspace in one of the two approaches, 
it means that its behavior is part of the legitimate profile.  
For this reason, the variation of the energy is due to the 
fact that the legitimate profile gathered from the 
centralized approach also considers anomalous users in 
the computation of the PCs that describe the normal 
subspace, thus resulting in polluted PCs.  Instead, our 
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approach discards the probes that contain such behaviors 
from the selection of CN, thus leading to a pollution-free 
profile.  
Fig.5.9 shows the different behavior of the two 
approaches, comparing the energy in the anomalous 
subspace of the users that belong to the Dos victim 
profile in a particular day under analysis.  
 
Fig.5.9 Distributed versus Centralized approach 
In the figure, two boxplots represent the energy of the 
anomalous profile in the two different approaches and 
two thresholds are shown. The lower one is the threshold 
set in the centralized approach to evaluate if a user is 
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anomalous or not, the second one represents the 
maximum threshold set in the distributed approach to 
identify the anomalous users among the users they are in 
charge of. As we can see from the picture, the Dos victim 
profile goes completely undetected in the centralized 
approach, thus meaning that the normal behavior was 
polluted and biased towards this type of behavior. In the 
distributed approach, all the users belonging to this 
behavior, with a number of calls at least of 50, is above 
the set thresholds and was easily identified. 
Considering all the users pointed out from the centralized 
approach, we are not able to discover any additional 
interesting profiles. By the way, if the day under analysis 
contains a large number of “active” anomalous users (e.g. 
profile such as a DoS attacker or a Telemarketer), the 
centralized approach assigns them a smaller energy in the 
anomalous subspace but is able to point out with more 
accuracy anomalous “passive” users (e.g. profile such as 
Call Centers), i.e. it is able to also point out users 
belonging to this type of profiles involved in a smaller 
number of calls.  Viceversa, if the day under analysis 
contains a large number of anomalous “passive” users, 
the centralized approach assigns to them a lower 
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anomalous energy but is able to point out with more 
accuracy the anomalous “active” users. 
5.2.2 Stability of the legitimate-user profile 
To compare the legitimate profile gathered from the two 
different approaches, we compute for each profile the 
Euclidean Distance between the Principal Components 
obtained in each day with the ones obtained the following 
day. In this way we can evaluate if the normal behavior 
of the phone users shows temporal stability. In the 
Fig.5.10 we start with the results obtained from the 
centralized approach. 
 
Fig.5.10 Distance Centralized PCs of each day with the following 
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We split the representation within the five week we have 
availability, taking as a reference point in the picture the 
distance between the centralized PCs obtained in each 
Monday with the one obtained in the following Tuesday. 
After a couple of week where the legitimate profile 
gathered from the centralized approach seems to be quite 
stable, the gathered PCs show an high variability, without 
any kind of recognizable pattern. If we look at the 
differences between the PCs that describe the normal 
subspace obtained from our methodology we can find the 
situation of Fig.5.11. 
 
Fig.5.11 Comparing Distributed PCs of each day with the 
following 
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In the picture we report a box plot of the five trials we 
have done, and the blue line represents an average of the 
obtained results. As we can show, the legitimate user 
profile shows a temporal stability that is absent with the 
centralized approach, except for a big peak we found in 
each one of the five trials, between the PCs of the third 
Tuesday and the third Wednesday. Interesting local peaks 
are also found between the Sundays and the Mondays, 
where it is possible to foresee a change of the use of the 
phone, since we pass from a week-end day to a working 
day. 
To justify the main peak we pointed out in the preceding 
analysis, we start evaluating if the change of the common 
behavior of the traffic is stable after the peak itself or not. 
Therefore, the two following pictures respectively 
represents the Euclidean Distance between the PCN of 
one day before the peak, e.g. the third Monday, and the 
PCN of each other day; the Euclidean Distance between 
the PCN of one day after the peak, e.g. the third 
Wednesday, and the PCN of each other day. The result is 
shown for one particular trials in Fig.5.12 and 5.13. 
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Fig.5.12 Euclidean Distance between 3
rd
 Monday and each other 
day 
 
Fig.5.13 Euclidean Distance between 3
rd
 Wednesday and each 
other day 
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As it is clear from both images, the profile we gather 
before the peak is completely different from the one we 
gather after the peak itself. If we look at the results 
shown in the previous section, we can see that after the 
third Wednesday, also the number of Principal 
Components needed to collect the 95% of the energy of 
the dataset changes. To be sure that our methodology is 
not showing wrong results we manually investigated the 
dataset to see if this change within the traffic is really 
happened.  
Thanks to the manual inspection we are able to point out 
that every single feature changes his behavior in the day 
of the peak and maintains this new status in the second 
period of our analysis: the average number of received 
and placed calls increases of a 10%, the number of 
suspicious or with network problem calls increases of a 
50%, while the average percentage of established calls 
and unique callers/callees decreases of the 10%.  
In Fig.5.14 and 5.15 we show an example of this change 
for the average number of placed and received calls and 
their establishment rate. To preserve the information 
given by the telecomm operator, the pictures are 
normalized with the average number of calls of the 
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dataset and the total establishment percentage 
respectively. 
 
Fig.5.14 Normalized number of calls placed and received 
 
Fig.5.15 Normalized Establishment Rate 
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The telecomm Operator confirmed us that new trunks of 
its network started to be monitored during the period 
under analysis and it is possible that we are able to point 
out one of the day where this happened (the peak 
corresponds to the first day of a month).  
By the way, a clear change of the common behavior of 
the user happens, and with our methodology we are able 
to adapt the description of the new normal subspace to 
this change. On the other hand, from this change of the 
behavior of the phone users, the centralized approach 
started to gather a legitimate profile different each day, 
without showing a clear pattern. 
5.3 Changing the number of probe 
To conclude the evaluation of our methodology we 
change the number of probes used to split the phone 
users present within the network. In this way we can 
evaluate if we are able to gather a similar PCs between 
probes reducing the number of users they are in charge 
of, even if this situation is not so realistic due to the fact 
that the PoPs within a telephone network can be at most 
some tens, or if we use a similar condition to the 
centralized approach. 
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The comparison is made in term of temporal stability of 
the legitimate profile gathered. In Fig.5.16 shows the 
result obtained using a network of 40 probes and the one 
obtained with the approach described in previous 
sections. The evaluation is made for both cases in 5 
different trials.  
 
Fig. 5.16 Euclidean Distance day to day, 20 and. 40 probes 
Even increasing the number of probes, and ending up 
with subset of only 4000 users for each probe, the 
methodology is able to gather PCN with a high grade of 
seasonality, i.e. the principal components mostly change 
as the week starts, and acts similarly compared to the 
technique we showed in the previous sections.  
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This result shows that decreasing the number of users 
each probe is in charge of, we are still able to gather 
similar PCs from one subset to another and that probably 
the obtained CN contains even less anomalous behavior 
of the community we gather with 20 probes. 
Fig.5.17, instead, shows the result obtained using a 
network of 5 probes and the centralized approach. 
 
Fig. 5.17 Euclidean Distance day to day, Whole Dataset and. 5 
probes 
Reducing the number of probes, and gathering the 
legitimate user profile choosing between a small numbers 
of possibilities does not help, and leads to PCN polluted 
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from the anomalies that the “clean” community still 
contains. The temporal stability in the picture does not 
show any seasonality and the trend of the legitimate 
profile is close to the one observed for the centralized 
approach, i.e. consecutive PCN appears dissimilar. 
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6 Conclusion 
The state of the art of the intrusion detection systems 
applied into telephone traffic can count on several 
possible techniques to prevent or recognize anomalous 
behavior within the network.  
This work represents my contribute to the research in this 
field, and consists in a new anomaly detection technique 
that aims at identifying anomalous phone users through a 
statistical study of the behavior of the network and at 
resolving part of the issues present in a centralized 
anomaly detection technique.  
Every day, our methodology gathers the general behavior 
of each user extracting statistics, such as the number of 
calls placed or received, from the Call Detail Records 
collected from PoPs distributed within the networks. 
From the obtained dataset, our methodology gathers a 
description of the common behavior of the network, i.e. 
the legitimate profile, exploiting a well-know statistical 
tool, the Principal Component Analysis. Thanks to the 
Principal Component analysis, our methodology obtains 
a compact representation of the user behavior of each 
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probe, and applying a technique able to point out 
communities within a given dataset, i.e. Agglomerative 
Hierarchical Clustering, can infer similarities within the 
network and subsequently the legitimate user profile. 
Based on the legitimate user profile, the technique 
performs anomaly detection. 
The most part of the users the techniques point out 
represent statistics referable to actual malicious behavior 
we can have within a phone network, such as 
telemarketer activity or DoS attack, while the last part 
can be seen as anomalous, but not malicious behaviors of 
a phone user, such as Call Center. 
The technique gathers these results distributing the 
anomaly detection stage and exploiting the PoPs already 
present in a phone network. Comparing the results 
obtained with a classical application of PCA to telephone 
traffic, where all decisions are centralized and a single 
point of failure is present in the anomaly detection, our 
methodology proves to be able to better adapt itself to the 
conditions of the traffic and to gather a pollution-free 
legitimate profile. Preventing that widespread anomalies 
are considered into the computation of the description of 
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the normal subspace, i.e. PCN, our methodology is also 
able to avoid that those kinds of behavior go undetected. 
Finally, beyond the advantages just mentioned, our 
methodology has also the interesting characteristic to 
exchange messages without private information between 
probes and the central node and, therefore, it has the 
possibility to be applied even in a scenario where more 
than one telecomm operator is present, as the one in 
Fig.6.1. 
 
Fig.6.1 Scenario with more than a telecomm operator 
Considering each telecomm operator as a probe, we can 
imagine that they are able to gather and send, without 
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disclosing sensible information, their PCN to a trusted 
global central node, which combines such information 
with the same algorithm shown for a single telecomm 
operator and gathers the PCs that describe the normal 
subspace of a larger clean community.   
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